Nongovernmental Organizations in Situations of Conflict: The Negotiation of Change by Hampson, Francoise
VIJIJI 
Nongovernmental Organizations 
in Situations of Conflict: 
The Negotiation of Change 
Hampson 
JUST AS ARMIES PLAN FOR THE NEXT WAR by learning the lessons of the last, so nongovernmental organizations (NOOs) in looking towards 
the future base themselves on the problems and dilemmas of the recent past. If 
the number of training sessions and conferences are anything to go by, 
NOOs think they have a variety of problems.! The last decade of the twentieth 
century is confronting them with unexpected challenges in situations of 
conflict. It is not that the NOOs are unfamiliar with conflict; something about 
recent conflicts has changed, with particular impact on NOOs. 
Some of that change may simply be the prevalence, to a greater degree than 
in the past, of elements previously present. One such example is the attempt of 
the fighting parties to control the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This 
may be accompanied by novel, or apparently novel, forms of fighting. If an 
object of the fighting requires the direct and indirect targeting of the civilian 
population, this is likely to have an impact on NOO activities. If, for example, 
an object of the fighting is to bring about the removal of a portion of the 
population from an area (e.g., "ethnic cleansing"), the conduct of hostilities is 
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likely to take a different form from that of conflicts that are in effect a "simple" 
power struggle. In both cases, there may be displacement of the civilian 
population, but the manner in which that happens, the length of the resultant 
displacement, and the prospects for ultimate return, will be very different. 
Another key change in the past decade with a significant impact on NOO 
operations is the likelihood that UN or military personnel, 
acting under a or mandate, will be 
found in the theater of conflict.2 
These developments have an impact not only on NOOs but also on 
organizations (lOOs), such as the United .Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The fact that both NOOs and 100s are 
adjusting to changes, possibly in different ways, simply adds to the complexity 
of the situation. NOOs are more used to working alongside 100s than with the 
military, but the 100s are subject to different pressures in adjusting to change 
than are the NOOs. It can be as difficult to adapt existing relationships as to 
forge new ones. That process of adaptation is made more complicated when an 
100 is given the role of NOO activities.3 
Once NOOs recognize the need at least to reconsider existing practices, they 
are likely to encounter further difficulties. There may be a natural tendency to 
assume that existing practices based on experience are right for the particular 
NOO; challenges to assumptions, which appear to be truths to those making 
them, are painful. Each NOO has its own "mandate" or objective. Other 
organizations with different objectives may need to change, but they are the 
experts on their own areas of activity; in that field, the particular NOO has 
nothing to learn from others. Where, on the other hand, it is recognized that 
there may be something to learn from the experience and solutions of other 
NOOs, the question becomes, how relevant is the experience of others? To 
what extent can one NOO learn from the experience of others? At least by 
meeting together and sharing what each perceives to be its difficulties, there is 
the opportunity for individual NOOs to reflect on their own assumptions and 
practices. 
This only serves to emphasize one of the clearest lessons of the past decade: 
NOOs cannot be lumped together. Their aims are different and their working 
methods are dissimilar. This means that in the same situation different NOOs 
will react differently. Both UN and forces and the parties to a 
conflict must avoid the assumption that all NOOs will react in the same way. 
Seen from outside, NOOs have more in common with one another than they do 
with 100s or other groups present in theater. Se!!n from within an NOO, 
however, the view may be otherwise. The goals, working methods, and 
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previous experience of a particular NGO may make it easy for it to work with 
UNHCR, whereas another NGO may have problems with some of UNHCR's 
working methods.4 
This paper will first examine the diversity of NGOs that may be found in 
conflict situations. There is no attempt to be comprehensive, an attempt that 
would be doomed to failure. The object rather is to illustrate the diversity. The 
variety of conflict situations in which NGOs may find themselves will then be 
considered briefly. There is an interplay between the type of NGO and the 
varieties of conflict situations which is likely to affect the NGOs' priorities and 
their perceptions of the problems. There will then be an examination of certain 
commonly recurring themes. Again, there is no claim to be comprehensive in 
either the identification of the themes or their treatment. The themes in 
question are humanitarian assistance, medical activities, neutrality, the 
reporting of violations of applicable legal norms, and the accountability of 
NGOs, including the role of the media. The paper will conclude with a highly 
speculative and personal view oflikely trends in the short to medium term. 
The Diversity of NGOs 
Any attempt to classify NGOs must be accompanied by two notes of 
caution.5 First, classification is a tool of convenience, not a straitjacket. 
Second, an NGO may fall into more than one of the categories.6 It must also be 
remembered, when considering NGOs in situations of conflict, that many of the 
NGOs present may not be conflict,specific because they were already working 
in a State when the fighting broke out'? That can include both local and 
out,of,country NGOs. This situation is likely to be particularly true of the first 
category. 
Development NGOs. Development NGOs often have long,term projects in a 
country. Their activities usually fall into the field of economic and social rights. 
They are involved in the development of the local infrastructure for the 
provision of essential needs. They may be group specific (e.g., women and 
or resource or issue specific (e.g., water or appropriate 
technologies9). They may work throughout one or more States or just within a 
certain distinct region(s). As the view of such assistance has changed in the 
\Vest from "charity" to development assistance, much greater attention has 
been paid to capacity building within the recipient community and to 
encouraging the participation of those whom the project is designed to assist.1o 
This involves listening as well as doing. Sustainability is more important than 
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speed. Many NOOs in this group will be used to working with or through 
governmental infrastructures, which may have the effect of helping to 
strengthen them.ll In building up local capacity, the NOOs are seeking to avoid 
creating dependency. 
Since their work is not conflict related, there are no "sides," simply people in 
need of assistance. The question of neutrality and impartial assistance to all 
sides does not arise. This enables development NOOs to confine their activities 
to one area within the State, even if the same need exists elsewhere. 12 For this 
group doing something somewhere is better than doing nothing at all. 
Relief NGOs. Relief NOOs are specialists in disaster assistance, whether the 
disaster is man,made or natural. They have no long,term commitment to a 
particular people or place, but rather seek to meet acute needs during periods of 
crisis. The issue of capacity building, or even infrastructure building, is not 
generally applicable. Involving the recipient community is much less important 
for reliefNOOs, but they have been affected by the debates within development 
NOOs and may make token gestures in this direction. There is a danger that 
they may ignore the impact of relief on the local economyY This may have a 
negative impact on long' term capacity,building, including the capacity for 
crisis management. The impact of relief can also be positive, as where the 
volume of relief available destroys a black,market.14 The reliefNOOs need to be 
experts in logistics and able to function autonomously. They cannot rely on 
finding an infrastructure in place, whether that be roads or governmental 
institutions. 
Some relief NOOs have built up a wealth of experience in a variety of 
theaters of conflict. They are aware of the need to negotiate with parties in 
control on the ground and realize the dangers in such negotiations. They are 
used to debates about their "neutrality" and of the need to be, and to appear to 
be, impartial. 
Other NOOs operate in a different way. Some are not NOOs in the 
traditional sense. Groups of individuals, troubled by a particular conflict, might 
put together a truck load of the relief they assume to be necessary. They may 
even manage to send a small convoy of trucks to the conflict zone, with a view 
to distributing the relief. Such individuals have enthusiasm and commitment 
but a total lack of experience. IS They have no knowledge of what is needed 
where. They have no experience of negotiating relief through zones of conflict. 
They may fail to recognize signals of personal danger. A problem arises when, 
unwittingly, their activities prejudice better organized and more significant (in 
terms of volume) relief efforts. The individuals involved should be encouraged 
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to put their efforts into fund,raising for experienced reliefNGOs. The difficulty 
is that established NGOs can hardly make such an argument; it appears to be 
born of rivalry or a fear of competition. Others must assume the responsibility 
for making the argument. 
If the group just discussed may be seen as exasperatingly naive amateurs, a 
much more serious problem is caused by relief "cowboys." Certain NGOs want 
to be seen as getting through to the places others cannot reach, whatever the 
price. The price paid, in terms, for example, of diverted relief supplies, will not 
be seen on television screens, but their presence will be. They are very 
dependent on donor support and therefore need to have a high profile presence 
in the areas of acute need, where the television cameras are most likely to be. 
Not only do such groups cause problems in theater, where the conflicting 
parties may assume that they can exact the same price from all relief agencies or 
that all such NGOs will behave in the same way, but more traditional relief 
NGOs may find themselves in competition with them for donor support. If the 
latter are seen to be doing something, they may attract greater financial support 
from individuals than more responsible, lower profile NGOs. This, in tum, may 
affect the conduct of the well,established NGOs. In order to maintain donor 
support, they may be tempted to ignore certain well, established principles of 
their modus operandi.16 There is little that can be done to regulate the 
"cowboys." The well, established reliefNGOs can, however, reinforce their own 
adherence to certain principles. They can agree with one another to make joint 
appeals in emergency situations and to distribute the resultant "kitty" 
according to an agreed formula. 17 This avoids competitive fund,raising. Under 
the leadership of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a code 
of principles has been agreed upon for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. IS It is to be hoped that governments, which are often, directly or 
indirectly, very significant donors to relief operations, will make their funding 
conditional upon adherence to these principles.19 
Medical NGOs. Development and relief NGOs may, of course, work in the 
medical field. In addition, however, there are dedicated medical NGOs which 
offer medical treatment in situations of conflict. What might be termed 
"medical/development assistance" includes group specific activity, such as that 
related to the promotion of women's health,z° and action related to a specific 
medical field. 21 The work may be part of a larger development program or may 
be the only activity of the organization. Certain medical concerns, notably 
female reproductive health, need to be handled with even greater cultural 
sensitivity than general development issues. Where the medical activity 
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involves dealings with patients and is handled by medical personnel, issues of 
medical ethics may arise, particularly with regard to confidentiality.22 
The provision of medical services in situations of conflict is particularly the 
province of the ICRC and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF). This is what 
distinguishes such organizations from relief agencies that include medical 
goods in their consignments. The ICRC and MSF send medical teams into the 
field, including specialists in war surgery.23 The two organizations are keenly 
aware of what distinguishes them from one another.24 From the outside, it is 
clear that they have very different ground rules with regard to where they will 
go and under what conditions. When it comes to the treatment of patients, 
both sets of medical personnel are bound by and apply the rules of medical 
ethics.25 They are marked out from other relief organizations not only on 
account of their adherence to a particular code of ethics; situations in which 
they have to work often require them to apply the principle of "triage" in 
assigning priority of treatment. In this, they have much in common with the 
medical services of armed forces. 26 They are not, however, subject to the 
constraints of a military hierarchy or military discipline. 
Movement NGOs. There are many NGOs working with refugees and asylum 
seekers, but this tends to be in the country of refuge, rather than in the place 
from which they are fleeing. Development and relief NGOs may work with 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), but they do not generally 
focus on the cause of displacement; rather, these NGOs deal with current 
needs. Human rights NGOs may address the causes of refugee displacement, 
but in the context of human rights violations rather than the resultant 
displacement. UNHCR is, of course, an agency concerned with the causes and 
effects of displacement. If there are NGOs that focus specifically on 
displacement (such as I.O.M.), they are not as well known as the most 
prominent development, relief, medical or human rights NGOs. 
Human Rights NGOs. The majority, and certainly the best known, of the 
human rights NGOs work principally in the field of civil and political rights. 
There are, nevertheless, certain NGOs that work outside the area of conflict on 
what might be seen as survival rights or economic and social rights, such as 
those to food and shelter.27 In addition, certain development NGOs articulate 
at least some of their activities in human rights language.28 What the human 
rights NGOs have in common is that they do not deliver assistance or services 
in the field in the same way as the organizations so far discussed. This does not 
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mean that they do not have a field presence; their function is, however, very 
different. 
Insofar as human rights violations are a significant cause, or symptom, of 
impending conflict, timely and effective response to the concerns articulated in 
the reports of NGOs would represent a form of conflict prevention. Yet it 
happens all too rarely. 
The principal tool of human rights NGOs is the report. Such reports aim to 
attract publicity in order to secure the "mobilization of shame." Human rights 
NGOs vary significantly in the use they make of their reports for lobbying. Many 
are not membership organizations, although they may have subscribers. Amnesty 
International is unusual in being not only a membership organization but one 
which relies heavily on the campaigning activities of members. This includes 
putting pressure not only on their own governments with regard to the situation 
in another country but also on the offending government by letter writing to a 
wide range of public officials. Many of the human rights NGOs make effective use 
of the UN human rights machinery by, for example, submitting information to 
UN thematic and Special Rapporteurs and to the Human Rights Committee 
established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.29 
The human rights NGOs once showed a certain initial reluctance to get 
involved in legal questions arising out of the conduct of hostilities. They often 
found themselves reporting on violations of human rights that occurred in 
situations of conflict, particularly in central America, but 
tended to concentrate on the impact on civilians. Since human rights law 
directly binds only State authorities, they tended to focus on human rights 
violations carried out by police and armed forces.3o This exposed them to the 
charge of since they did not address "violations" by 
entities. 
The pattern with regard to human rights reporting, however, has changed 
markedly over the past decade. Human Rights Watch led the way in analyzing 
situations and particular actions from the standpoint of humanitarian law as 
well as human rights law. This enabled them to examine the conduct of 
military operations.31 Amnesty International has, more cautiously, begun to 
follow suit.32 This is partly the product of a change in the pattern of human 
rights violations. While individual cases of arbitrary detention, torture, and 
unfair trials continue to exist, situations of gross and systematic violations of 
human rights have acquired greater prominence through conflicts such as 
those in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. 
The human rights NGOs also now seek to address "violations" perpetrated 
by entities. The language used and the campaigning tools 
239 
NGOs in Situations of Conflict 
are different, but these base themselves on the same standards as those 
applicable to States. 
Human rights NGOs need reliable sources of detailed information. One of 
the obvious potential sources in situations of conflict is the personnel attached 
to development, relief, and medical NGOs. This has given rise to real dilemmas 
for the latter, who fear that their neutrality and impartiality may be called into 
question if they provide information on violations of human rights or 
humanitarian law, however objective and impartial the reporting. This may 
prejudice their ability to continue providing relief to those in need. (This 
problem will be considered further below.) 
It has been seen that a wide variety ofNGO actors may be found in situations 
of conflict, with very different functions and views as to the principles 
applicable to their activities. A further, extremely Significant, variable is the 
type of situation in which they find themselves operating. 
The Diversity of Situations 
Before the Fighting. Many, but not all, recent conflicts have arisen in States 
receiving some form of development assistance. In some cases, the assistance 
has taken a traditional form, that is to say, the development of infrastructures 
to meet the basic needs of the population. In more recent years, direct or 
indirect assistance has sometimes come with strings 
attached. (Conditionality will be examined further below.) In the case of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, assistance has taken the form of 
help in adjustment, rather than development. What has been sought, notably 
by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSeE), has been 
the promotion of the institutions and mechanisms of civil sOciety. 
In many cases, conflict is the direct or indirect result of weak State 
structures.33 Where chronic instability has prevented effective 
governmental structures are weak, and the outbreak or intensification of 
fighting presents a challenge that overwhelms them. In other cases, the 
precipitating element may be the aftershocks brought about by the implosion of 
the former Soviet Union. Where the conflict is a reaction to an autocratic 
regime, it may be the indirect result of weak State structures, however 
paradoxical that may appear. Nervous governments faced with challenges to 
their authority do not have the confidence to allow space for dissent or to 
negotiate the challenge; instead, they respond with oppression, thereby 
contributing to that which they most fear. 
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The development NGOs are not well placed to address these concerns, 
beyond attempting to meet survival needs and, through cooperation with 
government agencies, seeking to instill good practice. They are, however, well 
placed to observe and to send warnings to the international community. 
Development agencies sent the clearest possible signals about the deteriorating 
situation in Somalia, but to no avai1.34 From outside the countries involved, 
human rights NGOs may send similar warnings. That happened most notably in 
the case of Rwanda. 
During the Fighting. The fighting may make it impossible to continue with 
development assistance, either on account of the hostilities or of the resultant 
dislocation, such as the displacement of the population. There will suddenly be 
a change in the political and legal context, and a plethora of new players in the 
field. It is all too easy, in an academic or bureaucratic ivory tower, to forget the 
chaos engendered by an ever,changing political and military situation, about 
which there is usually inadequate and/or outdated information, and by the 
constant need to achieve new means of cooperation with ever, changing 
organizations. It is little wonder ifNGOs simply react to events. 
NGOs with the most experience in conflict situations are likely to be those 
which have developed nwdi operandi to cope with predictable chaos. The 
difficulty, however, is that while chaos is predictable, its particular form is not. 
Emergency reliefNGOs will not have the experience of the particular society 
and culture that development NGOs will have gained. 
The apparently rigid principles of the IeRe may give the impression that 
they can cope with high levels of chaos and rapid change.35 They simply follow 
their tried and tested principles. The danger, however, is that the principles 
become a straitjacket that prevent the IeRe from adapting to changing 
circumstances.36 At least as great a problem is presented by NGOs that have not 
thought through in sufficient detail their principles of action and cooperation. 
They may be tossed around by circumstances, consoling themselves with their 
bottom line: "do no harm.,,37 
It would be presumptuous to propose solutions either to the IeRe or to less 
experienced NGOs. They can only be urged to take the time to debrief their 
personnel and attempt to identify, and then learn, the lessons to be learned. 
Even as they do so, they should avoid reassuring but illusory certainties; just as 
every NGO is different, so is every conflict. 
The same problems will also beset any UN or UN,authorized forces in the 
field. They need to avoid the dangerous tendency of lumping all NGOs 
together. This might best be avoided if they got to know them individually. It is 
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too late when they meet one another in theater. Getting to know and 
understand the NOOs (and vice versa) needs to happen before deployment, 
ideally through joint training exercises.38 This will not remove all causes of 
conflict, but it may remove some and enable them to predict others. The same 
is true of the relationships between NOOS.39 One of the lessons of recent 
peacekeeping and operations is that all parties in theater 
need not only to know their enemies, but also their friends. 
Towards the End of the Fighting. The fighting may come to a halt owing to 
temporary or or as a result of some form of 
however fragile. There will inevitably be a need for assistance in 
reconstruction. Even if there are still legacies of the fighting to be dealt with, 
such as the disarming of fighters and the (re)creation of an effective and 
accountable police force,40 the language of discourse will shift from 
humanitarian law to human rights law, from relief to development. Since the 
foundations for the future will have been laid during the conflict, 
it is as important that those laying the foundations understand what will come 
next as it is that those involved in reconstruction understand the foundations 
on which they are building. Human rights language is not the same as 
humanitarian law language, even though both are premised on the inherent 
dignity of the individual and the protection of the vulnerable. The two types of 
analysis complement one another.41 All the players, before, during and after 
the conflict, need to be familiar with both. 
The problems with which NOOs, and governments as major funders of their 
operations, will have to grapple vary depending on the NOO and the situation. 
Nevertheless, certain common themes do arise. 
Humanitarian Assistance 
In the constantly changing reality of the situation on the ground in Somalia, 
the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Rwanda, any number of elements may 
appear to have contributed to the result. That result may be a starving 
populace, deprived of humanitarian assistance, or the massacre of refugees, or 
the slaughter of innocents in "safe areas." It may be difficult to 
distinguish secondary elements from the irreducible kernel of hard choices. 
That effort must be made by NOOs, 100s, and governments working together if 
the dead of this decade are not to have died in vain. 
All the conflicts have been marked, to a greater or lesser degree, by the 
difficulty both NOOs and 100s experienced in getting humanitarian assistance 
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to those who needed it. It is not surprising that the attention of NGOs has 
turned to better coordination of relief efforts and to what must appear to be 
deficiencies in the legal rules applicable. There is always a need to improve 
coordination, but that is hardly an answer to denial of access to populations in 
need.42 Similarly, any examination of the legal rules applicable, whether in 
international or non,international conflicts, suggests that the problem does 
not lie there, although the failure to respect the rules is a problem. 
In an international conflict, starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is 
prohibitedY That does not extend to situations where starvation is the 
foreseeable result but not itself the tactic. Relief operations that are 
humanitarian and impartial in character should be undertaken, subject to the 
agreement of the Parties concerned.44 The Parties are required to allow and 
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of relief, even if it is destined for the 
civilian population of the adverse Party.45 The Parties have the right to 
prescribe the technical arrangements, which include, but are not confined to, 
the right to search relief convoys to confirm that they do not include military 
equipment.46 Relief personnel are to be protected, but their participation is 
subject to the approval of the Party in whose territory they will carry out their 
duties.47 While the language of the provision on humanitarian assistance is 
mandatory, the requirement of consent is susceptible to abuse. 
In non,international conflicts to which Protocol II of 1977 is applicable, 
relief actions of an exclusively humanitarian character should be undertaken, 
but subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.48 The 
Protocol does not require the consent of the non,State forces because that 
might appear to grant a certain status to the "rebels" and would be seen as 
interference in the internal affairs of the State concerned. Starvation of 
civilians as a method of combat is again prohibited.49 
In non,international conflicts to which only common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 is applicable, there is no provision on the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance. An impartial humanitarian body may, however, 
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict, and that offer cannot be claimed 
to constitute an interference in the internal affairs of the State.50 
No doubt there are gaps, and the law could probably be improved, but that is 
to miss the point. If the forces in control on the ground will not grant access to 
populations in need, then either the assistance convoys run the real risk of 
attack or they must be equipped to protect themselves. The consent of those in 
de facto control is a practical prerequisite to the unarmed delivery of assistance. 
Nor is the explanation plausible that the Parties are simply ignorant of the 
rules, that if only they knew them, then they would allow access to the 
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populations in need.51 The reasons for the denial of access may vary, but 
improved dissemination of the rules is likely to have only a very limited effect. 
The problem concerns not only access to populations in need, but also the 
lack of security of those people, whether they be in Sarajevo, in refugee camps, 
or in "safe areas."52 A BBC radio news bulletin carried an interview with an 
inhabitant of Sarajevo during the siege of the city. He commented that the 
international community seemed not to mind that he would die one day from a 
sniper's bullet, provided he was not hungry at the time. Humanitarian 
assistance was a substitute for an overall policy. 
The NGOs have recognized the linkage between the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and the protection of the civilian population.53 It is far 
from clear, however, that they have recognized that this may mean hard 
choices. Governments may be less inclined to assist in the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance if the price is high.54 For some NGOs, to save one life is 
to save a universe. They would prefer not to have 90 percent of the aid diverted 
to people in less need of it. They would prefer not to have to turn a blind eye to 
the massacre of civilians. They are not prepared, however, to see one person 
starve if that can be prevented. 
NGOs are born of idealism and commitment to those in need. It is not 
surprising that they should find it difficult to accept that the price of delivery of 
assistance may be too high. One must also be cautious about the greater 
willingness of governments, principal donors to NGOs, to contemplate such a 
possibility, unless it forms part of a policy designed to promote the greater good 
of the population. Determining that the price to be paid for delivery of 
humanitarian assistance is too high cannot simply be allowed to be a means 
whereby governments get themselves "off the hook." 
Some NGOs see this attitude on the part of governments as an extension of 
"conditionality" in the development assistance field. It is submitted that while 
the two do have something in common, there is a difference in this context. 
There are two priorities in relation to the population in need. One is their physical 
security, the other the provision of humanitarian assistance. These priorities 
may, in a given situation, compete with one another. 
The protection of the civilian population may also raise the question of the 
role of armed forces. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to deploy 
armed forces that are appropriately configured and equipped, and that have the 
mandate and, above all, political will to protect the civilian population. The 
attempts to date by the international community, with the exception of the 
"safe haven" in Northern Iraq immediately after its designation, have been 
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and doomed to failure from the outset.55 It may be that this is a job 
which should be done properly or not at all. 
NGOs cannot afford to lose their impartiality, but that still leaves them with 
hard choices.56 There may be a split between those that come to accept 
restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in order better to 
protect the civilian population, and those that cannot accept such restrictions. 
If governments channel their funding to the former, the latter will be 
dependent upon the support of individual donors. There may also be a split, not 
necessarily along the same lines, between those prepared to work with UN or 
forces and those that reject such cooperation on the grounds 
that it prejudices their impartiality. By establishing clear doctrine for peace 
support operations, including the tactical level, armed forces could contribute 
significantly to reducing the perceived problem.57 It probably cannot, however, 
be completely eliminated. While the question of the role of armed forces and 
the debate between humanitarian assistance and protection overlap, they also 
need to be considered separately. The latter presents a real challenge to NGOs, 
whether or not the military are present. 
Medical Assistance 
The essential dilemmas faced by those NGOs providing medical services are 
very similar to those in the field of humanitarian assistance generally, 
compounded by questions of medical ethics. Impartiality becomes 
individualized. The individual doctor is required to treat patients simply by 
reference to medical need.58 This may be part of the explanation behind a 
distinction in the operating practice of the IeRe and MSF. For the IeRe, the 
provision of medical services is usually part of a larger operation. Its practice is 
to insist on working on both sides of a conflict in order to protect its own 
neutrality and impartiality. On the other hand, MSF, which similarly adheres to 
impartiality, sees no conflict between principle and only working on one side, 
or indeed in only one zone of one side, of the conflict. MSF medical personnel in 
the exercise of their functions are impartial. They will treat by reference to 
medical need alone, wherever they happen to be exercising those functions. 
MSF and the IeRe can work alongside one another, but MSF is also to be found 
where the IeRe does not or cannot gO.59 
The two organizations also take very different positions in relation to 
cooperation with human rights investigators and the two ad hoc war crimes 
tribunals. Again, in the case of the IeRe this may be partly attributable to the 
fact that it engages in a wider range of activity than the merely medical. There 
245 
NGOs in Situations of Conflict 
is clearly a possible question of the confidentiality of the 
relationship.6O Giving information with consent, however, is clearly a different 
question, and the two organizations take very different positions on it. (That 
will be discussed further in the next section.) 
There is one particular medical issue that concerns not only these two 
organizations, but a wide range of other NGOs. It is best exemplified by the case 
ofIrma Hadzimuratovic, a little girl who was seriously injured in Sarajevo in an 
incident in which her mother was killed.61 She needed very swift medical 
intervention, which the medical personnel in Sarajevo were unable to provide 
because of their inadequate resources. Irma was eventually evacuated, thanks 
to the intervention of the British Prime Minister. It was, however, too late. Her 
injuries were by that time much harder to treat than they would have been, and 
she died some time later. 
This raises some problems similar to the humanitarian assistance/protection 
debate, compounded by the question of evacuation. Is the answer to improve 
the quantity of medical relief if you are simply patching someone up to be 
injured again later? Is it better to evacuate injured persons for medical 
treatment if they then have to be returned to a war zone, than to do your best in 
situ? Should children be evacuated, but only with their parents?62 
There were and are, in fact, criteria for determining questions of medical 
evacuation.63 Irma was regarded as not coming within them. It might be useful 
if these were reexamined by, among others, the World Health Organization, 
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), medical and children's NGOs 
and as wide a range of interested parties as possible. There may be no need for 
change, but there does seem to be a need for at least a reconsideration of the 
issue. 
Neutrality, Impartiality and The Reporting of Violations of 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
Reporting. Human rights NGOs carry out their function by gathering 
information, analyzing it in terms of the applicable legal norms, and then 
publishing the results. To effect change, they need publicity and campaigning. 
While they would deny that they are other than impartial, their activities may 
be seen to be, or be claimed to be, "political." Indigenous human rights NGOs, 
where they exist, may be particularly vulnerable to suppression. International 
human rights NGOs tend to work from outside the conflict zone, with only a 
very limited field presence. 
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Traditionally, relief agencies kept their distance from human rights NGOs, 
for a variety of reasons.64 Particularly during the Cold War, human rights 
activities were seen as "political." The relief agencies were also worried about 
stepping outside their "mandate," and there was perhaps a concern about the 
NGO equivalent of "mission creep." They also saw cooperation with human 
rights NGOs as calling into question their independence and impartiality. They 
were worried about the use that might be made of information supplied to 
another organization and about the protection of witnesses. They were also 
concerned that their own access to civilian populations would be jeopardized if 
they were known to be supplying information to other organizations. Last, but 
by no means least, they felt ignorant about human rights law, which seemed to 
them a very different type of activity. They did not know on what to report. 
There is no doubt that humanitarian agencies have a much larger field 
presence than human rights NGOs. They also encounter, on a day,to,day basis, 
the possible victims of violations of human rights law and humanitarian law.65 
Humanitarian NGOs are the passive recipients of information and, in other 
cases, are well placed to gather the relevant information more positively. 
The situation in Rwanda seems to have marked a turning point. Oxfam was 
the first agency to declare that what was happening was genocide, and it paid a 
price for doing so. The attitude of NGOs who were blind and/or silent about 
what was going on around them, provided they could deliver humanitarian 
assistance, was heavily criticized in a paper by African Rights.66 
Rwanda precipitated a period of soul searching on the part of relief NGOs. 
The first sign of a breakthrough was when a significant number of them 
recognized that evaluating actions in the context of human rights norms did 
not represent any loss ofimpartiality. That is to say that, while it may be done in 
a one,sided way, such reporting is not inherently partial or one,sided. The 
second breakthrough occurred when the relief agencies stopped to examine 
their oft,repeated mantra-"neutrality, impartiality, and independence." The 
ICRC principles dictate that its activities must be based on neutrality and 
impartiality.67 Many reliefNGOs became very suspicious of neutrality, seeing it 
as an excuse for remaining silent in the face of atrocities. If neutrality meant 
never taking sides, they wanted to take the side of upholding universal legal 
norms based on the rights of all individuals everywhere. They were on the side 
of victims of violations, whoever they were. In other words, they would be 
evenhanded in applying the same principles to everyone. This led them to 
proclaim their impartiality and independence, but not their neutrality.68 
While this evolution facilitated improved cooperation between reliefNGOs 
and human rights NGOs, it did not, and could not hope to, remove all the 
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problems. Some difficulties, such as the need to provide a minimum of human 
rights law training to relief personnel in the field, can be addressed over time. 
Others are more problematic. Whether being known to provide information to 
human rights NGOs will result in a relief agency being ordered out of the 
country or denied continued access to the population in need cannot be 
answered in the abstract. The experience in that regard is not all negative. 
Indeed, as noted at the Medecins sans Frontieres Conference in February 1996, 
"the real risks to our operations and our ethics lie in silence. And there are 
plenty of examples where human rights advocacy has in fact increased access to 
the victims and improved the safety of our staff, as was the case in Burundi."69 
The protection of witnesses is also a very real problem, as the experience of 
those who have testified in Arusha, Tanzania, before the war crimes tribunal 
and then returned to Rwanda has shown. 
There may, nevertheless, be a shift in attitude. If the starting point of relief 
NGOs is that they will gather information, in some cases seek it, and then pass it 
on to responsible human rights NGOs (where they feel it to be safe to do so and 
where they have the requisite guarantees as to the use to which the information 
will be put), then the effectiveness of human rights reporting could be 
transformed. Even if the relief agencies were only able to indicate likely 
witnesses and sources of information, this would still be of considerable 
assistance. 
What is particularly striking is the leading role played by a medical NGO in 
promoting the cooperation between relief agencies and human rights NGOs. 
They might have been thought to have the biggest problem with the sharing of 
information. Nevertheless, MSF has taken the lead and may have encouraged 
other NGOs by its example. Of course, there is a separate question in relation to 
the sharing of information. It is one thing to cooperate behind the scenes with 
human rights NGOs. It is quite another thing to give evidence in criminal 
proceedings before an international criminal tribunaUo 
Giving Evidence. While the ICRC's policy is never to cooperate in this way,71 
some intergovernmental agencies, such as UNHCR, have sought to strike a 
balance between protecting their clients' confidentiality and giving evidence. 
Other organizations and individuals, even within the same group, have taken 
differing positionsY Again, MSF has been in the forefront of those promising 
the greatest possible cooperation with the tribunals. In relation to the giving of 
evidence at the request of the prosecutor, the rules of evidence give NGOs a 
certain protection.73 It remains to be seen what will happen when the defense 
seeks to call an NGO employee as a witness and argues that the testimony is 
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vital for a fair disposal of the case. If the judges agree and subpoena the 
individual in question, a refusal to appear may result in contempt proceedings, 
even, it would appear, in absentia.74 It is to be hoped that the judges will 
recognize that in some cases there may be legitimate grounds for the refusal to 
answer a question. That will be, and should be, determined by the judge and 
not the NGO employee. 
Advocacy and Campaigning. The twin issues of advocacy and campaigning 
raise many of the same issues for NGOs as the reporting of violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law. In some cases, the law on charities imposes 
restrictions.75 Some organizations have, nevertheless, become frustrated by 
only treating symptoms and have begun to campaign about the causes of the 
problems which they are there to address. Oxfam and Christian Aid, for 
example, have campaigned regarding the causes of poverty and the cycles of 
emergencies. Handicap International, a French,based NGO that provides 
prostheses, became concerned about the extent of the need for artificial limbs 
on account ofinjuries from anti,personnelland mines (APMs) and put pressure 
on the French government to call for a conference to review the 1980 
Conventional Weapons Convention.76 This resulted in the revision of Protocol 
II of that Convention relating to the use ofland mines.77 While the revised text 
marked a considerable achievement, most notably by extending its application 
to non,international conflicts, it fell far short of what NGOs perceived to be the 
need-an outright ban on the use of APMs. (The Review Conference also 
adopted a new fourth Protocol on blinding laser weapons.) 78 Subsequently, a 
group of States, led by Canada, decided to negotiate a treaty banning the use of 
APMs, which was signed in Ottawa by 120 States in December 1997.79 
The campaign to ban the use, manufacture, and stockpiling of anti, 
personnel land mines has been a quite remarkable achievement for NGOs. 
Even five years ago, it was unthinkable that such a treaty ban could be 
achieved. One may question the impact that the Ottawa treaty banning the 
use of APMs will have, since the most important users and manufacturers of 
APMs are not Parties to it, but this does not detract from the achievement of 
the NGOs.80 
This was not the work of one NGO or even of a linked group, such as medical 
NGOS.61 It represented a remarkable feat of organization to create a small 
international committee, with a coordinating function, and national 
organizations, consisting of a loose coalition ofNGOs. The arrangements had 
to be both loose and flexible, to cope with the variety of mandates, objectives, 
and campaigning methods of the different types of organizations involved. 
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Participating groups included children's organizations, development NOOs, 
refugee groups, relief organizations, human rights NOOs, and arms trade 
groups. All these groups were able to find something which they were able to 
contribute to the campaign. 
The important question for the future is whether this is a precedent or a 
phenomenon. Certain features of the APM issue made it an ideal 
subject for a campaign. The scale of the problem was, and is, enormous. The 
principal casualties are civilian. It was relatively easy to understand the 
technology. The message was simple: what was sought was an outright ban on 
use, in which case a ban on manufacture and stockpiling was logical. The 
nature of the injuries and of the victims made a significant visual impact. One 
only has to consider the campaign on laser weapons designed to blind, which 
was running at the same time as the land mine campaign, to see how 
significant such features are. There were essentially only two organizations 
campaigning about laser weapons, the ICRC and the Arms Project of Human 
Rights Watch.82 Those lobbying understood the technology and the issues, 
but there was never the mobilization of public opinion that occurred in 
relation to APMs. 
The key question then becomes whether there are other weapons that might 
provoke the same reaction in the public as land mines. Concern has been 
expressed about the use of small caliber ammunition and cluster weapons, but 
it seems questionable whether they would lead to a mass campaign.B3 It is more 
likely to be the specialist NOOs that become involved. If a conflict were to 
occur with a widespread use of incendiary weapons, that issue might become 
the focus for a campaign but there is no sign of that at present. There may now 
be a generally higher level of awareness and concern about the environmental 
impact of spent munitions and the insecurity which both causes, and is the 
product of, high levels of expenditure on conventional weapons, but it seems 
unlikely that that awareness will become sufficiently focused to produce a 
campaign as effective as that to ban land mines. 
At present, it would seem that the land mine campaign is likely to be unique, 
at least in its scale of public mobilization and the range of participating NOOs. 
Nevertheless,. there are NOOs well placed to campaign about the use of other 
weapons, and a precedent now exists for a wide range of NOOs to work 
together. The first group will continue to be involved in campaigns about 
specific weapons. It is not possible to predict whether one of those weapons will 
seize the imagination of the public. It takes an unusual combination of factors 
to do so. 
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The Accountablity of NGOs 
Accountability is not, in this context, confined to legal accountability, 
although it goes without saying that NGOs are subject to the laws of the places 
in which they work. It includes moral responsibility, particularly where third 
parties treat NGOs as having some such responsibility for their actions. It also 
includes accountability in the sense of cause and effect. Where a person or 
body responds to the activities of an NGO in a way that affects the ability of the 
NGO to continue with those activities, this might be seen as de facto or effective 
accountability, irrespective of whether it is "justified" or even reasonable. The 
NGO has to take into account the possibility of such a reaction when 
determining its course of action. . 
In a more restricted sense, accountability usually involves the attainment of 
goals. A person or body evaluates the performance of the NGO by reference to 
objective criteria. This requires both measurable goals and objective criteria of 
evaluation. \Vhen the beneficiaries of action are people, there are the usual 
difficulties in determining whether there should be a qualitative, and not 
merely quantitative, evaluation and, if so, how to set about it. Is it necessarily 
the case that NOO One is "better" because it delivers 1,200 tons of relief in the 
same time and/or for the same cost that NOO Two delivers a thousand tons? Is 
it necessary to consider the accountability ofNGOs to recipients/beneficiaries 
and also to donors, both individuals and States? Consideration also needs to be 
given to the relationship between accountability and the role of the media. 
Accountability to RecipientslBeneficiaries. Development NGOs have had, for 
quite some time, a sense of responsibility toward the people whom they are 
trying to help.B4 There has been a shift over the past forty or so years from the 
sense that the recipients are the beneficiaries of charity to a perception that the 
NGOs are working in collaboration with the local community. This has been 
articulated through such concepts as empowerment and participation, a,nd has 
led to greater reflection about the impact of assistance within the community. 
These ideas began naturally to "leak" from development to relief operations. . 
There is a different paradigm in the case of activities relating to violations of 
human rights or humanitarian law. Human rights NGOs and the ICRC have 
been acutely aware of the potential risk to individuals, rather than the 
community, in publicizing names. It may be, but this is speculation, that the 
preoccupation of development/relief NGOs with communities rather than 
individuals contributed to their silence in the face of human rights violations. 
The recent recognition by reliefNGOs that assistance cannot be divorced from 
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protection suggests that their position is evolving. It may be that their focus on 
communities means that they \"ill only become engaged in protection activities 
where the violations are widespread and systematic. Provided they recognize 
that unpunished individual violations may become a practice, it may be 
necessary, in order to achieve a sensible distribution of roles, for reliefNGOs to 
become involved in action only in the case of widespread violations. Human 
rights NGOs are probably better suited to dealing with individual cases. In that 
situation, relief agencies could help by passing on information. 
It may be significant that MSF, a medical organization, is at the forefront of 
moves to get relief NGOs to consider the issue of protection. While medical 
activities might seem to be a type of relief action, they do involve the 
relationship between an individual patient and medical personnel. In other 
words, medical NGOs do not function only at the community level. 
Ultimately, it does seem that all NGOs have a sense of responsibility toward 
recipients/beneficiaries. However, the form it takes differs, depending on the 
type of activity involved. 
Accountability to Donors. It is necessary to draw a distinction between 
accountability to individual donors and to State or organizational donors, not 
least because the two constituencies may impose competing, if not conflicting, 
demands. In addition, organizations and States are more likely to require 
accountability in the most literal sense. The administration and control 
involved may deter some NGOs from even seeking such funding. Two different 
ideas may become confused in the minds of NGOs. One is accountability, 
which is some type of obligation to another person or body. The other is the 
desire ofNGOs to carry out their activities in as many of the places where they 
are needed as possible. This requires money. It would be understandable if they 
sought to tailor their activities to what is most likely to appeal to their donor 
constituencies. This is not the same thing as an obligation of accountability to 
donors, even if it is articulated in those terms. 
Individual donations may be closely linked to media coverage of the 
epicenter of a crisis. In that case, the NGO has to be seen to be there. On the 
other hand, State or organizational funding may have strings attached, either 
conditionality or something that looks like it. The NGO then has to determine 
whether it is simply interested in raising as much money as possible, or whether 
it has a view as to the maximum possible funding from one particular source 
which is consistent with its independence. For some this may mean a refusal to 
accept any governmental funding. That is more likely to be the case for human 
rights NGOs than for relief/development NGOs. 
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The need to maintain donor support and/or accountability to donors may 
have a direct impact on the activities undertaken. In particular, it may prompt 
an NGO to be involved in a highly visible relief program, irrespective of the 
price paid in terms of the diversion of relief or silence in the face of serious 
violations of the law. 
Accountability and the Media. To consider generally the role of the media in 
conflict situations is beyond the scope of this paper.85 Some commentators 
appear to assume that there is a "CNN factor," while others dispute that it has 
the significance often ascribed to it.86 Some journalists think their role is to be 
objective and detached, whereas others aspire to what Martin Bell has 
described as "the journalism of attachment." That does not mean biased 
reporting: it means identifying with and conveying the plight of victims and 
daring to express anger and outrage. 
As seen above, donor support may be affected by the coverage of an NOO's 
activities. That may, in turn, put pressure on the NOO to be not where there is 
most need or the greatest possibility of effective action, but where the cameras 
are. In some cases, NGOs can determine where the cameras go. The NGOs may 
be a principal source of information for the news media and also a source of 
relatively secure transport. 
NGOs are generally aware of their need for media coverage and, over the 
years, have spent effort and resources in developing professional media 
strategies. It is less clear whether they are aware of possible dangers in their 
ambiguous two,way relationship with the media. In seeking to use the media to 
their own advantage, they may also be, deliberately or inadvertently, 
manipulated. It may be necessary to distinguish between the print media and 
television. \Vhen reference is made to the "CNN factor," it is only the latter 
which is being considered. 
The question in this context is the extent to which NOOs are accountable 
for, first, the impact of media coverage where they make the coverage possible 
or are the subject of the coverage and, second, the effect of that coverage on 
their own operations. At the very least, this is a question that responsible NGOs 
should be asking themselves. 
The Future 
Speculation is an inherently hazardous activity. It is not possible simply to 
examine where NGOs are now and to project that forward. There are many 
other variables, all of which will interact with one another, and which need to 
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be taken into account. First, there are possible changes in the causes and forms 
of conflict. Second, there is uncertainty as to the likely international response. 
The international community may decide that acute crises are too difficult to 
handle and must simply be contained until they burn out, or else it may 
discover the will to seek real solutions. Third, 100s may adjust their priorities 
and modi operandi in various ways. 
It is possible, on the basis of recent experience, to draw up a nightmare 
scenario. In it, parties to a conflict seek an unlawful goal and consequently 
engage in systematic violations of humanitarian law. The only concern of 
NOOs is to ensure that people are fed. They turn a blind eye to the fact that 
many victims will be dead in a few hours or a few days. Armed forces external to 
the parties to the conflict are helpless, either owing to inadequate numbers and 
equipment and an inappropriate mandate or else a fear of casualties, which 
means that they only move in such large numbers as to be incapable of 
influencing the situation on the ground. States, in the meantime, use assistance 
as a substitute for policy and as an excuse for closing frontiers to prevent mass 
movement of people. Some of these elements have been present in many 
recent conflict situations. If they are not to recur, lessons must be learned. 
There is evidence that at least some NOOs are biting the very painful bullet. 
They have at least recognized that assistance needs to take account of the need 
for protection. There is not much value in "better fed than dead" if the 
recipients are going to be killed later. Some NOOs know they have to strike a 
difficult balance; discovering appropriate ways of doing so will not be easy. The 
lCRC, in some ways, exemplifies the dilemma. It has a wealth of experience and 
is used to relying on its demonstrable neutrality and impartiality. At the same 
time, this "guardian of humanitarian law" refuses to allow its delegates to give 
evidence before war crimes tribunals. There will be a certain degree of trial and 
error as NGOs seek a way forward, and no two situations are the same. Some of 
the NGOs are, nevertheless, looking for practical solutions.87 It seems likely 
that there will be a split in the NGO community. Some will insist on delivering 
assistance, whatever the price. This group will include not only "cowboys," but 
those who see themselves as idealists. Others will, with reluctance, see how the 
wind is blOwing, in particular with respect to State and organizational donors, 
and go along with it. Still others will be convinced of the need for adjustment, 
seeing it as providing more net help. 
In this situation, it is not the responsibility of only the NGOs to adapt and 
change. States, particularly members of the Security Council, have a huge 
responsibility. They have so far proved incapable of responding to an 
impending crisis, even where the NGOs and the UN machinery have made it 
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clear what is at stake. Nor have States so far shown a willingness to bite their 
respective bullets. It is possible that the greatest single contribution that could 
be made to protecting victims from atrocities would be by breaking the cycle of 
impunity everywhere. The law of armed conflict is a useful tool because it is 
based on the equality of belligerents (in other words is impartial) and is based 
on individual criminal responsibility. To break the cycle of impunity requires 
an effective international criminal court with an independent prosecutor. 
States have to be willing to surrender their own soldiers to its jurisdiction. If 
they create a tribunal with fairness and integrity, and if they train their soldiers 
not to break the rules, they have nothing to fear from such a court. There is a 
great deal to gain. 
If those resorting to force know that they are likely to be tried if they 
prosecute the conflict in unlawful ways, but will not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court if they only target combatants and military objectives, 
this might have a significant effect on their conduct. Not only would it 
facilitate the task of NOOs in negotiating access for humanitarian assistance, 
but the fighters would implicitly be recognizing the legitimacy of NOO 
involvement in the promotion of the rule oflaw by providing protection. If the 
belligerents recognize that there are unlawful ways of fighting, it cannot be a 
sign of bias or lack of neutrality to seek to uphold the law. 
Only States, acting diplomatically and where necessary through their armed 
forces, can break the cycle of impunity. Only States can set effective controls 
on the transfer of weapons. Only States can wield the sticks and carrots 
appropriate to a particular situation. There is no shortage of rhetoric and hand 
wringing. There is, to date, a lack of effective action. 
The NOOs, armed forces, and donor States are going to have to surrender 
long, cherished ideas if they are to reach an accommodation. They have 
learned that they cannot simply insist on doing things in their own way, 
without regard to others. They will have to recognize and adjust to the 
priorities and needs of the other players. This does not mean that they have to 
adopt them. The first step would be if they all spoke the same language. If they 
used humanitarian law, human rights law, and refugee law as tools, they might 
not say the same thing, but they would at least begin to understand one 
another. 
This is beginning to happen between armed forces and at least some NOOs, 
and is most likely between those who have shared the experience on the 
ground. Donor States are reexamining questions of humanitarian assistance, 
but there is less evidence that they are assuming their particular responsibilities 
in relation to conflict prevention and breaking the cycle of impunity. 
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NGOs, armed forces, and donor States have recognized that they have the 
same ultimate goal-the effective assistance and protection of victims. They 
have also recognized that they need to search for ways forward, both separately 
and together. There is still a long way to go before they convert these ideas into 
practical solutions to the problems faced on the ground. 
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